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I. INTRODUCTION

In February of 2010, Billie June Smith received exciting news.1
As the lucky winner of a statewide drawing, this elderly woman was
awarded a giant check for $100,000.2 Billie June's good fortune cost
her nothing, for she did not spend any money on the winning ticket.
Instead, she became eligible for the grand prize when she decided to
save for her retirement at her local credit union.3
Billie June was the inaugural grand-prize winner of "Save to
Win," an innovative pilot program that launched in 2009 to test a
concept known as prize-linked savings. 4 In partnership with the
nonprofit Doorways to Dreams, eight credit unions in the Michigan
Credit Union League ("1VICUL") introduced account options to their
members that were designed to "make savings fun."5 These prizelinked savings ("PLS")6 products incorporated an exciting element of
chance that rewarded a consumer's decision to save. By opening a
twelve-month share certificate worth a minimum of $25, consumers
earned one entry into a grand-prize drawing.7 Each additional deposit
of $25 generated a duplicate entry, and participants were penalized
for withdrawing their savings too quickly.8 In addition to the chance to
1.
See Save to Win: 2009 Final Project Results, http://perma.cc/6YBN-GMSD (d2dfund.org,
archived Feb. 16, 2014) (describing the unique contest terms and spotlighting Billie June).
2.
See LakeTrustCreditUnion, 2009 Save to Win Grand Prize, http://perma.cc/5N4U-EESY
(youtube.com, archived Feb. 16, 2014) (recording Billie June's reaction to receipt of her award).
3.
Id.
4.
Save to Win: 2009 FinalProject Results,supra note 1, at 7.
5.
Id. at 9; see also Prize-Linked Savings: An Opportunity to Save, While Having Fun,
http://perma.cc/YR4X-PNJX (d2dfund.org, archived Feb. 16, 2014) (articulating the common
marketing phrase "making savings fun").
6.
This Note abbreviates "prize-linked savings" to "PLS" whenever the phrase appears in
its adjectival form.
7.
Save to Win: 2009 Final Project Results, supra note 1, at 9. As described in Part III.C,
share certificates at a credit union are the functional equivalent of certificates of deposit at a
traditional bank.
8.
Id.
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win monetary prizes, participants also accumulated interest on their
federally insured share certificates according to rates set by each
credit union. 9 Credit unions advertised the initiative as a no-lose
opportunity.10
Over 11,500 Michigan residents opened PLS accounts in the
inaugural year of the Save to Win program." Even under conservative
estimates, participating consumers collectively deposited over $8.5
million in PLS accounts.12 These results indicate that prize-linked
savings can effectively incentivize individuals to set aside money that
they would otherwise spend. The low dollar amount required for each
entry was designed to attract participants with low-to-moderate
incomes, and the pilot program gained significant consumer
popularity.13 In the years since Billie June received the first jackpot
prize, Save to Win has expanded its PLS program.14 Today, the MCUL
proclaims the program's unique benefits with a simple slogan: "When
you Save to Win you not only get a chance at winning . . . , but you

walk away with the deposits you made over the year - plus interest."15
The remarkable success of Michigan's Save to Win program
demonstrates that prize-linked savings has tremendous potential as a
device to encourage Americans to save. This Note analyzes various
PLS models and explores opportunities to reproduce such programs
nationwide. Part II explains the PLS concept, its longstanding
international history, and its promise as an effective incentive to save.
Part III considers various institutions that could promote PLS
initiatives in the United States, identifies legal challenges that hinder
such innovation, and highlights credit unions as particularly suitable
vehicles for widespread PLS expansion. Part IV develops a strategy
that credit unions can use to promote programs like Save to Win in
states that currently disallow prize-linked savings. Part IV also

9.
See id.; see also NCUA Share Insurance Fund Information, Reports, and Statements,
http://perma.cc/JS7N-Y34D (ncua.gov, archived Feb. 17, 2014) (describing that the National
Credit Union Administration insures the accounts of members in federal-chartered and most
state-chartered credit unions).
10. See It's Time to... Save To Win, How it Works, http://perma.cc/K7M2-5WQD
(mi.savetowin.org, archived Feb. 16, 2014).
11. Save to Win: 2009 FinalProject Results, supra note 1, at 5.
12. Id. at 5, 14.
13. Id.
14. See Joanna Smith-Ramani et al., Playing the Savings Game: A Prize-Linked Savings
Report 6, http://perma.cc/65BS-3UPY (d2dfund.org, archived Feb. 16, 2014) (noting that Save to
Win has expanded to fifty-eight participating credit unions).
15. It's Time to ... Save To Win, How it Works, supranote 10.
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proposes certain legislative provisions that could guide future
development of PLS promotions in the United States.
II. THE HISTORY AND PROMISE OF PRIZE-LINKED SAVINGS
Although prize-linked savings has only recently received
significant attention in the United States, financial innovators in
other nations began incorporating the concept centuries ago. 16
Inspired by this historical tradition, economists have devoted several
decades to researching PLS initiatives worldwide and advocating their
incorporation into the U.S. financial market.' 7 Part II.A illuminates
the concept of prize-linked savings, and Part II.B provides an overview
of its international and domestic history. Part II.C describes the
appeal of prize-linked savings for consumers, identifies how it can
encourage low-income saving, and highlights its desirability for
financial institutions.
A. The Structure of Prize-Linked Savings Accounts
Financial and governmental institutions use prize-linked
savings as a strategy to incentivize individual savings by
incorporating an element of excitement and chance.18 The sponsoring
institution-referred to hereafter as the PLS "vehicle"19-offers a
product that provides individuals the chance to win a large prize
based on their decision to invest in savings accounts or bonds. 20
16. See, e.g., Mauro F. Guill6n & Adrian E. Tschoegl, Banking on Gambling: Banks and
Lottery-Linked Deposit Accounts, 21 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 219, 225-29 (2002) (discussing prizelinked savings programs from around the world).
17. Most notable among proponents for prize-linked savings is Peter Tufano, a renowned
economist and former dean of the Harvard Business School. Tufano is also the founder of
Doorways to Dreams, a nonprofit organization dedicated to building "a world where the financial
system promotes lasting social and economic prosperity for every family." D2D's Mission and
Vision, http://perma.cc/A22S-P7J8 (d2dfund.org, archived Feb. 16, 2014).
18. See, e.g., Prize-Linked Savings, supra note 5, at 2. The term "lottery-linked savings"
also appears in financial literature to discuss the same concept. See, e.g., Peter Tufano & Daniel

Schneider, Using FinancialInnovation to Support Savers: From Coercion to Excitement, in THE
INSUFFICIENT FUNDS: SAVINGS, ASSETS, CREDIT, AND BANKING AMONG LOW-INCOME
HOUSEHOLDS 149, 176-77 (Rebecca M. Blank & Michael S. Barr eds., 2009).
19. See Tufano & Schneider, supra note 18, at 179-80 (suggesting, as explored below in
Part III, that the prize-linked savings concept is compatible with a wide range of sponsoring
institutions).
20. See id. at 176-77; see also Peter Tufano et al., Consumer Demand for Prize-Linked
Savings: A Preliminary Analysis 3 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 08-061, 2008),
available at http://perma.cclL8HD-CAWK (describing the standard prize-linked savings
structure.
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Although the particular details of PLS programs vary, most of
these initiatives follow the same basic structure. Upon depositing a
designated minimum amount into a PLS account, individual savers
receive the opportunity to win a predetermined monetary prize. 21
Moreover, individuals often receive an additional entry into the prize
drawing for every multiple of the designated minimum that they
deposit within the specified contest time frame. 22 This additive device
strategically rewards increased savings by improving the saver's odds
of winning. Moreover, PLS contests often contain limitations that
discourage withdrawal, 23 and PLS initiatives have witnessed
sustained participation and high "rollover" levels (i.e., consumers tend
to reopen share certificates or certificates of deposit after the initial
twelve-month term).24 High rollover rates confirm that PLS accounts
incentivize saving for the long term by maintaining the thrill of a
lottery. 25
Of course, PLS initiatives differ from traditional lotteries in
important ways. When an individual purchases a lottery ticket, he or
she must spend money for one fleeting chance to "win big." Lottery
awards represent only a small percentage of ticket revenues, and
losing participants receive nothing beyond the entertainment value of
their gamble. 26 In contrast, by depositing in a PLS account,
individuals save money and are guaranteed, at minimum, the full
return of their principal investment. 27

21.
See, e.g., Prize-Linked Savings, supra note 5, at 2; see also Guill6n & Tschoegl, supra
note 16, at 219.
22.
Guill~n & Tschoegl, supra note 16, at 219. For instance, Michigan's "Save to Win"
program set a minimum deposit amount of $25. Thus, if a member of a participating credit union
deposited $75 into a PLS account, that individual received three entries into the grand prize
drawing. Save to Win: 2009 FinalProjectResults, supra note 1, at 9.
23. For instance, Michigan's inaugural Save to Win program permitted only one
withdrawal a year "to encourage sustained saving." Save to Win: 2009 Final Project Results,
supra note 1, at 9.
24. See, e.g., Melanie Kwon Duch, Save to Win: Highlights from Michigan 2012,
http://perma.cc/MT6X-2VUV (d2dfund.org, archived Feb. 16, 2014) (reporting an 82% rollover
rate for the Michigan Save to Win program from 2011 into 2012, with "80% still open in
December 2012").
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Ronald J. Rychlak, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A Historical
Examination of State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. REV. 11, 49-50 (1992) (noting that in
states with government-sponsored lotteries, "[Lotteries] only transfer funds from ticket
purchasers to the lucky winners . . .. The state receives money from losing players . . . .").
27. See, e.g., Prize-Linked Savings, supra note 5, at 2 (noting that a defining feature of
prize-linked instruments is that "[e]veryone who saves maintains their deposits").
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This win-win phenomenon is possible because the program's
grand prizes are drawn from a portion of the interest earned on the
deposited funds. 28 The interest rates offered by PLS accounts vary
from program to program. 29 Some programs may offer relatively low
interest rates, while others may ask participants to forego fixed
interest payments entirely in exchange for the prize opportunity. 30
Regardless of the precise form, the guaranteed return of principal is a
defining feature of PLS accounts. In other words, the savers "buy" the
opportunity to participate in the PLS lottery by foregoing a portion of
the fixed interest payments that would otherwise be received from a
traditional savings account. 31 In this innovative game of chance, the
savers "gamble" for the opportunity to receive a grand prize that is, in
actuality, just a disproportionately high interest return on their
investments. 32
The most successful PLS programs rely on empirical evidence
about consumer behavior and incorporate features designed to attract
and maintain savers. 33 For instance, studies report that individuals
prefer multiple opportunities to win smaller prizes rather than less
frequent opportunities to win higher amounts. 34 Similarly, activitybased incentives-like adding entries based on the frequency of
deposits rather than the volume of savings-are often more appealing
to consumers and thus more effective in encouraging savings. 35
Accordingly, initiatives that offer frequent small prizes and the
possibility of increasing the odds of winning "combat account holders'
fatigue by reinforcing their continued interest despite the rarity of big
wins."36 For these reasons, Michigan's Save to Win program has
altered its contest terms in the years since Billie June won her grand
prize.37 Instead of offering one $100,000 prize, the program now
promises ten annual $10,000 prizes along with smaller monthly
28. Guilldn & Tschoegl, supra note 16, at 219.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Smith-Ramani et al., supra note 14, at 11 (applauding the flexibility of PLS
programs that willingly adjusted program terms in order to attract a broader consumer base).

34. Id.; see also Heidi Boyd & Nick Maynard, Prize-Linked Savings and Financially
Vulnerable Americans: Insights from a Five-State Study 14-15, http://perma.cc/BV7X-T5AQ
(d2dfund.org, archived Feb. 16, 2014) (recommending that PLS programs embrace empirical
findings about consumer behavior).
35. Boyd & Maynard, supra note 34, at 14-15.
36. Guilldn & Tschoegl, supra note 16, at 223.
37. Smith-Ramani et al., supra note 14, at 11.
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prizes.38 The MCUL continuously responds to survey data about
savers' preferences, and their adjustments have sustained the success
of Save to Win. 39 Since the pilot program launched in 2009, the
number of participating credit unions has grown from eight to fiftyeight, and "over 25,000 unique [PLS accounts have saved] more than
$40 million from 2009-2011."40
B. The History and Prevalence of Prize-Linked Savings
1. International Programs
Currently offered in twenty-two nations worldwide, 4 1 PLS
initiatives have a well-developed history. The marriage of gambling
and savings first appeared in 1694 when the British government
introduced its Million Adventure. 42 During the program's sixteen-year
tenure, investors purchased tickets for 210 for the chance to win over
two thousand prizes, ranging from £10 to £1,000, per year. 43 The
Million Adventure differed from contemporary lotteries in that it not
only offered ticket holders prizes, but it also promised a guaranteed
return of X1 per year.44 Historians estimate that the Million
Adventure "attracted tens of thousands of adventurers," which greatly
outnumbered participants in rival lotteries and debt-financing
ventures. 45 The Million Adventure ultimately met its demise when
wartime expenses rendered the state unable to make the promised
payments. 46 Nonetheless, the Million Adventure paved the way for the
United Kingdom's current PLS venture: Premium Bonds. 47
Run by the National Savings and Investments ("NS&I"), an
executive agency in the United Kingdom akin to the U.S. Treasury,

38. Id.
39. Id. at 6, 11.
40. Id. at 6.
41. See Boyd & Maynard, supra note 34, at 3 (referencing the international context of prizelinked savings).
42. Anne L. Murphy, Lotteries in the 1690s: Investment or Gamble?, 12 FIN. HIST. REV. 227,

230-31 (2005).
43. Id. at 231.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 231-32.
47. See Melissa Schettini Kearney et al., Making Savers Winners: An Overview of PrizeLinked Savings Products, in FINANCIAL LITERACY: IMPLICATIONS FOR RETIREMENT SECURITY AND
THE FINANCIAL MARKETPLACE 7, 9-12 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Annamaria Lusardi eds., 2011).
(discussing both the Million Adventure and the current British Premium Bond program).
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the Premium Bond program began in the 1950s with the slogan
"Savings with a Thrill!"4 8 This public program is backed by the
government and closely follows the general PLS structure detailed in
Part II.A. Winning bondholders receive tax-free prizes comprised of
the "interest on the total value of all eligible bonds."49 The NS&I
reports that at the end of 2012, citizens had invested more than
£43 billion in over 22 million outstanding Premium Bonds.50 In
January 2013, for example, lucky bondholders received over
255 million in prizes, though many are still unclaimed. 5 '
Outside of the United Kingdom, other nations also have
experience with prize-linked savings. Sweden 52 and Kenya 53 currently
issue government-sponsored PLS bonds, and Japan 54 and Pakistan55
have used them in the past. Likewise, private financial institutions
across the globe have launched PLS initiatives. Nations with private
vehicles include Japan, Turkey, Germany, and Spain.56 Commercial
banks use this strategy in Latin America, with Banco Bilboa Vizcaya
engineering PLS programs in Venezuela, Argentina, Mexico and
Columbia.57
Indonesia is particularly interesting because it has PLS
initiatives that are designed to attract the financially vulnerable.5 8
For instance, the Bank Rakyat Indonesia began offering PLS accounts
48. Id. at 9.
49. Id. at 10; see also Our Savings and Investments, Premium Bonds: A £1 Million Jackpot
Every Month, http://perma.cclRL9V-XHGH (nsandi.com, archived Feb. 16, 2014).
50. Media Centre, New Millionaire from London in January's Jackpot Drawing,
http://perma.cc/LHM9-ZJSK (nsandi.com, archived Feb. 16, 2014).
51. Id.
52. See Guill~n & Tschoegl, supra note 16, at 226 (reporting that the Swedish government
has offered lottery-linked bonds since 1918).
53. See id. at 227 (highlighting the Premium Bond Scheme administered by the Kenya Post
Office Savings Bank since 1978).
54. See id. at 226 ("[T]he Japanese government offered [prize-linked bonds] after World
War II . . . .').

55. Id. at 227. In response to a liquidity crunch in the wake of 1998 Pakistani nuclear
testing expenses, a government-owned bank issued prize-linked savings accounts, and several
private and public banks launched similar programs. Currently, the State Bank of Pakistan
forbids prize-linked products within Pakistan but with certain exceptions. For an interesting
summary of prize-linked savings in Pakistan and the role of the Council on Islamic Ideology, see
id. at 228-29.
56. See id. at 226-27 (describing lottery-linked accounts by the Japanese Jonan Shinkin
Bank, the Turkish Demirbank, and the Spanish Banco Santander, as well as the PS Sparen und
Gewinnen or gewinnsparen accounts offered by private German banks).
57. See id.; see also Kearney et al., supra note 47, at 8 (highlighting current examples of
PLS account s worldwide).
58. Kearney et al., supra note 47, at 12-14.
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in 1986 through its Simpanan Pedesaan Rural Savings Project
("SIMPEDES"). 59 Account holders are eligible for semi-annual lottery
drawings, and SIMPEDES has quickly become the nation's most
popular savings product.60 This initiative has been praised as hugely
successful, particularly "in the field of savings mobilization." 61
2. Domestic Programs
In the United States, a handful of PLS programs have
appeared within the last decade. 62 Doorways to Dreams, the nonprofit
organization founded by economist and Harvard Business School
professor Peter Tufano, has been instrumental in encouraging this
wave of innovation.63 As the foremost champion of prize-linked
savings, Doorways to Dreams has worked tirelessly in partnership
with other organizations to develop PLS initiatives across both the
nonprofit and private financial sectors. 64
Although perhaps unexpected, nonprofit organizations have
been effective engines for the growth of prize-linked savings in the
United States. 65 Of course, most nonprofit organizations are not
legally authorized to be depositories for consumer investments.66
Nonetheless, given their remarkable fundraising abilities, many
nonprofits have provided the award money for PLS initiatives.67 These
nonprofits must partner with an institution capable of accepting

59. KLAUS MAURER, CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOREST: WORKING GROUP ON
SAVINGS MOBILIZATION, BANK RAKYAT INDONESIA (BRI); INDONESIA (CASE STUDY), at vi, 6-7

(1999), availableat http://perma.cc/GNW3-9NJ6.
60. See id. at 14-15 (noting that SIMPEDES accounts amount to 76.1% of all BRI
instruments).
61.

Id. at 30.

62. See, e.g., Prize-Linked Savings: Overview, http://perma.cc/JZ5U-PBF8 (d2dfund.org,
archived Feb. 16, 2014) (recognizing recent PLS programs in the United States).
63. Nick Maynard, Prize-Based Savings: Product Innovation to Make Saving Fun,
http://perma.cc/TB6L-9PL7 (d2dfund.org, archived Feb. 16, 2014); see also The D2D Story,
http://perma.cc/E4JH-8P5X (d2dfund.org, Feb. 16, 2014) (describing the history and founding of
Doorways to Dreams).
64. See Overview, http://perma.cc/4DVK.3ZWC (d2dfund.org, archived Feb. 16, 2014)
(describing Doorways to Dreams' mission to improve the "financial opportunity and security of
low and moderate income consumers"); see also Prize-Linked Savings: Overview, supra note 62
(highlighting the role of Doorways to Dreams in recent PLS programs).
65. See Smith-Ramani et al., supra note 14, at 15 (highlighting the success of nonprofits
such as Impact Alabama and the Maryland CASH campaign).
66. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2012) (authorizing national banks alone to receive
deposits).
67.

Id.
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deposits and safeguarding investments in order to complete the
structure of prize-linked savings.
Nonprofits engaged in PLS initiatives have focused particularly
on "Tax Time Savings"-a policy facilitated by changes to IRS forms
that enables taxpayers to directly purchase U.S. Treasury bonds with
their tax refunds. 68 For instance, Impact Alabama, a nonprofit
dedicated to antipoverty programs, secured over $20,000 in private
donations in 2011 to offer a PLS promotion in conjunction with its
Volunteer Income Tax Assistance initiative.69 For every $50 that they
invested in U.S. Treasury bonds, taxpayers became eligible to receive
prize money (provided and awarded by Impact Alabama). 70 Similarly,
a network of nonprofit organizations known as the Maryland CASH
campaign offered a prize-linked savings program with an additional
twist.71 Whenever taxpayers invested at least $50 in U.S. Treasury
bonds, they received not only a ticket for the grand prize but also a
"customized scratch-off ticket for a chance to win five or ten dollars
cash instantly." 72 The innovative efforts by these nonprofits should be
applauded. Studies confirm that nonprofit organizations have been
pivotal in encouraging nonsavers to invest rather than consume.73
PLS programs have not been limited to the nonprofit sector;
several private institutions have experimented with them as well. In
partnership with Doorways to Dreams, Centra Credit Union in
Indiana launched the first PLS product in the United States in 2006.74
Next, Doorways to Dreams helped launch Michigan's Save to Win in

68. Tax Time Savings, http://perma.cclXLG8-AYMG (d2dfund.org, archived Feb. 16, 2014).
PLS programs that center around Tax-Time Savings are complicated by the government's
January 2012 transition from paper to electronic bonds. Id. The PLS programs discussed in this
section were not affected by that policy change.

69.

See Val Walton, Tornado Victim Wins $10,000

in Savings Bond Contests,

http://perma.cc/33YD-FLKL (al.com, archived Feb. 16, 2014) (spotlighting the winner of Impact
Alabama's inaugural prize-linked savings sweepstakes).
70. See id. (describing the conditions of the Impact Alabama contest).
71. See Smith-Ramani et al., supra note 14, at 15 (describing the terms of the Maryland
CASH Campaign's PLS contest).
72. Id. Very few states exempt nonprofit organizations from prohibitions on lotteries;
legality remains an important concern for these organizations. As such, both of the above
initiatives were intentionally designed as sweepstakes and carefully avoided characterization as
lotteries. See id. at 15 n.17.
73.

STEPHEN BROBECK, CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., THE ESSENTIAL ROLE OF BANKS AND

CREDIT UNIONS IN FACILITATING LOWER-INCOME HOUSEHOLD SAVING FOR EMERGENCIES 6-7
(2008), available at http://perma.cc/QTM6-GKRD (noting that most successful attempts to
encourage low-to-moderate income individuals to save have been led by partnerships between
nonprofit organizations and financial institutions).
74. Id.
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building upon its experience working with Centra Credit
Union on improving consumer demand, targeted marketing, and prize
design.76 The success of the Michigan initiative, in turn, prompted
replica Save to Win programs in Nebraska,77 North Carolina,78 and
Washington. 79
As explored further in Part IV, the legitimacy of these Save to
Win programs turned upon specific PLS-enabling statutes from the
legislatures in each state.80 Connecticut,81 Maryland, 82 Maine, 83 and
Rhode Island84 have amended their banking and gaming laws to allow
credit unions and other financial institutions to host PLS initiatives.
Unfortunately, however, lobbying efforts by PLS advocates have not
always been so successful. For instance, a New York bill-proposing
amendments to banking laws to "author[ize] credit unions to conduct
savings promotion prize giveaways" 85-was recently vetoed by the
governor, despite overwhelming approval in both the state assembly
and senate.86 Legal barriers currently limit the prevalence of PLS
programs in many other states as well. Nevertheless, there is an
opportunity for facilitative change, as discussed in Part IV.
2009,75

C. The Potential Societal Benefits of Prize-Linked Savings
Especially after the recent financial crisis, many Americans
live paycheck to paycheck, and unexpected expenses from car repairs
75. See It's Time to .. . Save to Win, http://perma.cc/XJK6-VD3N
archived Feb. 16, 2014).

76.

See id.

77. See
It's Time
to... Save
(ne.savetowin.org, archived Feb. 16, 2014).

78.

(mi.savetowin.org,

to

Win

Nebraska,

http://perma.cclV27S-P7A5

See It's Time to ... Save to Win North Carolina, http://perma.cc/G5LH-6QE8

(nc.savetowin.org, archived Feb. 16, 2014).

79.

See

It's

Time

to... Save

to

Win

Washington,

http://perma.cc/4BWY-PKQX

(wa.savetowin.org, archived Feb. 16, 2014).
80. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 490.411; NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-701; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 54-109.64; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.46.0356, 19.170.030.
81. CONN. GEN. STAT. P.A. 13-96 § 1.
82. MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. §§ 6.716, 1-101(g).
83. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17 § 1831(5), (14-A).
84. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-5-29.
85. S. 5145, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013) (vetoed by Veto Memo 229 on Sept. 27, 2013).
86. See S 5145 New York Senate Bill, http://perma.ccfKA85-VGY8 (openstates.org, archived
Feb. 17, 2014) (reporting legislative approval of S 5145 by the New York State Assembly as 138
"yes" votes, two "no" votes and three "other" votes; and by the New York State Senate as 62 "yes"
votes and one "other" vote). After the governor's veto, New York State Senator Andrew Lanza
introduced a similar bill to on March 12, 2014. See S 6805 New York Senate Bill,
http://perma.cclS5XR-VCJ5 (open.nysenate.gov, archived Mar. 25, 2014).
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to medical bills can send a family spiraling into fiscal ruin.87 People
who habitually save money have a safety net when these financial
crises occur, but low-income families often do not have the luxury of
choosing restraint over consumption.88 In fact, one study found that
25%of surveyed individuals lacked the financial capacity to cope with
emergencies and could not "come up with $2,000 in 30 days."89
Furthermore, an additional 19% could only survive such urgent
financial pressure by selling their assets or obtaining payday loans
that too often involve the dangers of predatory lending. 90 Moreover,
surveys administered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC") reveal that approximately 10% of American families are
unbanked, "meaning that they do not have access to banks," and that
many more are underbanked, meaning they "are not fully
participating in the mainstream financial system."91
This reality has prompted antipoverty activists and nonprofit
organizations to challenge traditional investment norms and advocate
for creative solutions that promote savings. 92 Prize-linked savings is
prominent among the suggested strategies to reduce the number of
unbanked Americans. 93 Proponents predict that PLS programs would
also appeal to "nonsavers"-individuals who have not already
purchased savings or investment products.94 Research confirms this
intuitive belief.95 Because prize-linked options appeal to nonsavers

87. E.g., Prize-Linked Savings, supra note 5, at 1.
88. See id. ("Personal savings have been on a decline in the US for the last two decades. In
early 2008 the personal savings rate fell to just 0.1% [and though it has increased following the
recession], it is still lower for low and middle-income families.").
89. Annamaria Lusardi et al., Financially FragileHouseholds: Evidence and Implications,
at 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17072, 2011), available at
http://perma.cc/F9PN-P6KZ.
90. Id.
91. Susan Burhouse & Barbara Ryan, Findings from the FDIC Survey of Bank Efforts to
Serve the Unbanked and Underbanked, 3 FDIC Q. 39, 39 (2009).
92. For more information about the mission and inspiring accomplishments of D2D, see
The D2D Story, supra note 63.
93. See Timothy Flacke, 2011-2014 D2D Strategic Plan:Innovation for Economic Inclusion
10-11, http://perma.cc/XU49-35HV (d2dfund.org, archived Feb. 16, 2014) (including prize-linked
savings among other innovative strategies to improve financial literacy in the United States).
94. See Tufano et al., supra note 20, at 8 (noting the common belief among issuers that PLS
products had particular appeal among nonsavers).
95. See id. at 8, 22 (reporting findings that "among [surveyed] nonsavers, 65% expressed an
interest in the [prize-linked savings] product. Among savers, only 48% expressed an interest");
see also Save to Win: 2009 FinalProject Results, supra note 1, at 15 ("Of those [2009 Save to Win
participants] completing the survey, 56% of Save to Win certificate holders reported that they
had not saved regularly before opening the Save to Win account.").
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and the most financially vulnerable, this innovative device promises to
particularly benefit low-income individuals.96
Proponents boast that the basic structure of prize-linked
savings-a certain return on the principal investment plus an exciting
opportunity to win significant prizes-offers tremendous appeal to
consumers.97 Prize-linked savings does not purport to replace
traditional savings accounts; instead it offers an engaging alternative
for individuals who would otherwise direct their funds towards
immediate consumption.98 PLS products are safe investments, and the
maintenance of the principal is attractive for loss-averse individuals. 99
Moreover, PLS products capitalize upon "the behavioral phenomena
that investors may avoid large gambles, but will take on small
ones." 00 In other words, consumers, fueled by excessive optimism in
the face of low probability, are willing to risk small amounts (in the
form of foregone interest) for the large gain of a contest jackpot.101
Advocates therefore contend that the win-win nature of prize-linked
savings is guaranteed to facilitate demand.102 Pilot PLS contests have
verified this prediction. For instance, in Michigan, financially
vulnerable individuals participating in Save to Win constituted "over
40 thousand unique account holders ... [saving] $72.2 million," with
sustained account activity and high rollover rates.103
Advocates also assert that PLS accounts are an attractive
alternative to traditional lottery tickets.104 Although state-sponsored
lotteries can play an important role in funding public education,105
lotteries come at a significant social cost.106 For instance, studies show
96. Tufano et al., supra note 20, at 8.
97. See id, at 6-7 (analyzing the appeal of prize-linked savings to consumers).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 7.
100. Id. at 8.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 6-7.
103. See Melanie Kwon Duch, supra note 24, at 1-2 (recounting data of Michigan's Save to
Win program from 2009 to 2012, and noting the rollover rates from 2011 to 2012 in the following
amounts for categories of financially vulnerable accountholders: 94% for "Asset Poor," 93% for
Low-to-Moderate Income, 92% for "Single With Dependents," 94% for "Non-Savers," and 94% for
"Non-Financially Vulnerable").
104. A Winning Proposition: Creating Economic Opportunities Through the State Lottery,
http://perma.cc/GNZ5-2U3L (d2dfund.org, archived Mar. 16, 2014).
105. Id. at 3.
106. See, e.g., Melissa Schettini Kearney, State Lotteries and Consumer Behavior 2 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9330, 2002), available at http://perma.cc/GR5UQXET (noting that critics abhor state lotteries as exploitative of consumers and institutions that
"prey on minorities and the poor").
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that low-income individuals devote a higher percentage of their
resources to lottery tickets than individuals in higher income
brackets. 107 Because of this discrepancy, critics often describe state
lotteries as "a regressive tax on the poor." 08 Perhaps this disparity
can be explained by the fact that low-income individuals, despite the
miniscule odds of winning the lottery, have no other way to quickly
obtain a large sum of money.109 In fact, a survey reported that "21% of
Americans, and 38% of those with incomes below $25,000, think that
winning the lottery represents the most practical way for them to
accumulate several hundred thousand dollars."" 0 Prize-linked savings
can change this perception, providing an entertaining, but safer
alternative to squandering money on lottery tickets."'
Programs like Save to Win are not only desirable to consumers,
but they are also attractive from the perspective of the vehicles that
would offer the PLS products. Financial institutions stand to gain
from prize-linked savings because the game-like structure will attract
a larger, untapped consumer base.112
In addition to attracting new customers, issuing vehicles have
other economic incentives to offer PLS accounts. For instance, issuers
can offer low returns on PLS accounts because PLS customers choose
to forego some or all fixed interest returns in exchange for the chance
to win.113 When the total prize distribution is less than the aggregate
amount that would otherwise be paid in interest, the issuing
institution stands to gain.114 PLS vehicles are thus able to set interest
rates and prize amounts that will be mutually beneficial to the
participating consumer and the issuing institution. PLS vehicles can
107. See id. at 7 (reporting statistical data implying "that on average, low-income
households spend a larger percentage of their wealth on lottery tickets than other households").

108. Patricia Kathryn Carlton, All Bets Are Off An Examination of Alabama's Proposed
Lottery and the EducationalInadequacies It Was Intended to Remedy, 51 ALA. L. REV. 753, 779
(2000).
109. Kearney et al., supra note 47, at 4.
110. Lusardi et al., supra note 89, at 13 (quoting Press Release, Consumer Federation of
America, How Americans View Personal Wealth vs. How Financial Planners View This Wealth
(Jan. 9, 2006)).
111. See Kearney et al., supra note 47, at 5 (describing the appeal of prize-linked savings as
an appealing alternative to traditional lotteries).
112. See, e.g., Guill~n & Tschoegl, supra note 16, at 220 ("The issuers' incentive to offer the
accounts or bonds is that savers like the lottery feature .... .").
113. See id. at 223 (suggesting that PLS issuers can offer nominal interest rates because
consumers overestimate their odds of winning and are thereby willing to accept lower returns in
exchange for contest eligibility).
114. See id. at 220 (explaining that PLS issuers benefit "[w]hen the lottery is not a 'fair
game' that is, when the expected value of a ticket is less than the foregone interest").
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also institute program limitations that discourage early withdrawal of
funds-such as a contest rule that disqualifies participants who make
more than one withdrawal per year." 5 In addition, the high rollover
rates for PLS contests suggest that these innovative products generate
repeat customers." 6 In short, prize-linked savings programs have high
supply-side appeal, which helps explain their popularity globally.
Despite the emergence of PLS programs in some states and
their clear theoretical appeal, legal roadblocks have limited the
availability of prize-linked savings in the United States."17 As explored
in Part III, it is important that PLS advocates first determine what
institution is the most suitable vehicle for this innovative strategy.
Moreover, as discussed in Part IV, careful legal compliance and
strategic legislative proposals will be necessary to bring about the
tremendous potential benefits that PLS programs could have in the
United States.
III. POTENTIAL VEHICLES FOR PRIZE-LINKED SAVINGS PRODUCTS

As explained in Part II.B, many diverse institutions have
experimented with PLS products,s18 and innovation should be
encouraged across private, nonprofit, and public sectors alike.119
Nonetheless, advocates and policy makers should consider what
institutions would most effectively incorporate PLS programs. This
Part analyzes which institutions could legally issue PLS products and
suggests that credit unions are the most appropriate vehicle.
Many different institutions-including the U.S. Treasury, state
governments, and private entities like banks and credit unions-could
implement PLS programs in the United States.120 Yet these
institutions are not equally suited for efficient, large-scale expansion
of prize-linked savings.121 For instance, vehicles differ in their abilities
115. See, e.g., Save to Win: 2009 Final Project Results, supra note 1, at 9 (noting that
Michigan's Save to Win program employed this rule "to encourage sustained saving").
116. See, e.g., Melanie Kwon Duch, supra note 24, at 1-2 (reporting high rollover levels for
Michigan's Save to Win program).
117. See Prize-Linked Savings, supra note 5, at 4 (discussing the existing barriers to
widespread expansion of prize-linked savings).
118. See id. at 4 (applauding existing PLS programs).
119. See Smith-Ramani et al., supra note 14, at 23 (asserting that all potential vehicles for
PLS products are "worth pursuing").
120. See id. (noting that varied PLS products can be distributed through different channels).
121. See id. (evaluating various prize-linked savings models based on "Effectiveness: [wihat
is the potential for consumer impact?" and "Efficiency: [ius this a sustainable product for
providers?").
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to structure, market, and ensure the stability of PLS products. Beyond
these practical details, however, the regulatory landscape is also
different for each potential vehicle.
Most critically, no vehicle can launch a PLS program unless the
law allows it.122 Gaming and lottery activities are often heavily
regulated on the state level, and many states flatly prohibit lotteries
and other types of gaming and gambling. 123 While the statutes vary by
state, the term "lottery" typically encompasses any "event in which a
prize is awarded based on chance, where entry is gained by giving
something of value."124 Some statutes use the term "raffle" instead of
'lottery," but they prohibit the same types of programs. 125 Of the fortythree states with government-sponsored lotteries, 126 most of these
programs are specifically authorized as narrow exceptions to broad
bans on lotteries. 127 Thus, any new initiative, like a PLS program,
risks being declared illegal.128
To avoid classification as an illegal lottery, vehicles could
characterize their PLS program as a sweepstakes, which can be
described generally as "a game of chance in which entry is open to all
entrants without any payment or other consideration."129 In many
states, the distinction between lotteries and sweepstakes depends on
the participant's consideration: if eligibility depends on opening a
savings account with the issuing vehicle, the program may be deemed
a lottery or raffle.130 To be considered a sweepstakes, a participant's
122. See Prize-Linked Savings, supra note 5, at 3-4 (emphasizing the legal barriers that
must be removed to facilitate expansion of prize-linked savings).
123. See Rychlak, supra note 26, at 44, 47 (explaining that state-sponsored lotteries operate
under narrow exceptions to broad prohibitions against gaming and gambling that exist in most
states).
124. Save to Win: 2009 FinalProject Results, supra note 1, at 24.
125. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 490.411 (establishing that "[i]f authorized by the
credit union board, a domestic credit union may conduct a savings promotion raffle").
126. See Lottery Results, http://perma.ce/36UM-LUFN (usa.gov, archived Feb. 16, 2014)
(noting that "43 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands" have
state-run lotteries).
127. See Rychlak, supra note 26, at 44, 47 (noting that by the late 1800s "lotteries were
prohibited in most states by constitutional provisions" and that most modern state lotteries were
authorized by particularized legislation that did not amend general prohibitions on lotteries).
128. See, e.g., Barber v. Jefferson Cnty. Racing Ass'n, 960 So. 2d 599, 609-15 (Ala. 2006)
(holding dog-racing course and gaming equipment fell within definition of illegal lottery).
129. Save to Win: 2009 Final Project Results, supra note 1, at 24 (emphasis added). A 2006
pilot program by the Centra Credit Union in Indiana was designed as a sweepstakes to avoid
legal challenges. For more on Centra's program, see Kearney et al., supra note 47, at 16.
130. Compare ALA. CODE § 13A-12-20 (defining prohibited lotteries as "an unlawful
gambling scheme in which . . . players pay or agree to pay something of value for chances"), with
id. § 8-19D-1 (defining permissible sweepstakes as "[a] legal contest or game where anything of
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eligibility for prizes cannot depend directly on giving monetary
consideration like a savings deposit. 131 Unfortunately, however, this
mechanical change undermines the overall goal of prize-linked
savings, as it eliminates the incentive to make new deposits.1 32
Ultimately, structuring a PLS contest as a sweepstakes is not a viable
solution to the legal complications in states that prohibit private
lottery activity.
Accordingly, lottery prohibitions remain a significant barrier to
PLS programs in the absence of specific authorizing legislation.
Potential vehicles must address these legal challenges before
launching any PLS programs. 133 Furthermore, some vehicles face
additional legal barriers due to their unique regulatory environment.
In the end, the success of PLS programs will require potential vehicles
to obey and possibly change the applicable legal rules.1 34
A. PublicInstitutionsRequire Significant Popular Support
Governmental entities in the United States could incorporate
prize-linked savings into existing public ventures. Such programs
could begin at the national level with the U.S. Treasury Department
or the local level with existing state lotteries. Government-issued PLS
products would require specific legislative authorization, but PLS
advocates may struggle to secure it.
On the federal level, the Treasury Department could replicate
the Premium Bond Program in the United Kingdom by offering a
product that combines the excitement of a lottery with the security of
investing in Treasury securities.135 These prize-linked options would
mimic the basic structure outlined in Part II.A, but the central
financial instrument would be a U.S. savings bond backed by the full

value is distributed by lot or chance" without additional reference to consideration); see also Save
to Win: 2009 FinalProjectResults, supra note 1, at 24.
131. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2143b (authorizing "sweepstakes, provided that
persons who enter the contest or game of chance are not required to venture money or other
valuable things.").
132. See Kearney et al., supra note 47, at 18 (observing that PLS programs modeled as
sweepstakes "permit non-savers to win").
133. See Prize-Linked Savings, supra note 5, at 4 (recalling legal roadblocks that complicate
development of PLS programs in the United States).
134. See supra Part I.B.
135. See supra Part II.B (describing the government-sponsored PLS program that has been
offered in the United Kingdom since the 1950s).
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faith and credit of the federal government. 136 Under this model,
citizens purchasing government bonds would forego interest payments
in exchange for grand-prize eligibility. 137 Although such a program is
certainly feasible, the implementation of a nationwide program would
pose a costly administrative challenge. Moreover, Treasury officials
have expressed reluctance about pursuing federal PLS legislation that
could undermine state gaming laws.138
At the state level, advocates are encouraging state lotteries to
incorporate PLS products into their existing infrastructure.139 State
lotteries already possess the legal authority to offer prize-linked
savings, given that their unique exemption from gambling laws
provides monopoly power over gaming activities in their state. 40
Furthermore, proponents of this model argue that governments have a
legitimate interest in encouraging savings behavior and that state
lotteries "have a long history of being employed by the state to raise
funds for positive public policy outcomes."141 Adding savings programs
to existing state lotteries is a creative and promising avenue if prizelinked savings gains traction in the future.
For now, however, state lottery commissioners have not been
convinced to adopt this strategy. In fact, the director of the New York
Lottery concluded, after extensive research on the possibility of
partnering with Doorways to Dreams, that a PLS game was not
financially viable.142 Because a significant portion of the money
derived from lottery ticket sales is funneled to state budgets,143

136. For instance, program engineers could incorporate the lottery element into the
foundational structure of Series EE Savings Bonds and Series I Savings Bonds. For a description
of the bonds currently available, see Comparing EE Bonds and I Bonds, http://perma.cc/5QQ229CZ (treasurydirect.gov, archived Feb. 16, 2014).
137. Guilldn & Tschoegl, supra note 16, at 219 (discussing the basic structure of PLS bonds).

138. See, e.g.,

Stephen J. Dubner, Who Could Say No to a "No-Lose-Lottery'7,

http://perma.cc/KQW8-8EMD (freakonomics.com, archived Feb. 16, 2014) (reporting an interview
of Michael Barr, the former Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions for the U.S. Treasury
and announcing the U.S. Treasury's reluctance to "wage war" on long-standing state lottery law).

139. See A Winning Proposition,supra note 104.
140. See id. at 3 (highlighting the "unique" legal position of state lotteries).
141. Id. at 2-3.

142. See Who Could Say No to a "No-Lose Lottery'?, http://perma.ccl8TJ6-DWQH
(freakonomics.com, archived Feb. 16, 2014) (podcast discussion with director of the New York
Lottery, Gordon Medenica, who reportedly "couldn't make the math work" after consideration of
lottery-sponsored prize-linked savings).

143. See, e.g., Lottery Payouts and State Revenue, 2010, http://perma.cclZAG6-MGBH
(ncsl.org, archived Feb. 8, 2014) (analyzing most recent data available and reporting that, in the
aggregate, state lotteries in the U.S. paid out 61.7% in prizes, spent 4.8% on administration, and
maintained 33.4% of revenue for use by states).
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legislatures in the forty-three states that currently run lotteries 144
would likely not endorse a competing game-especially one designed
to encourage savings rather than raise revenue.145 In addition, the
seven states without public lotteries are even less likely to embrace
public PLS contests, since they have decided to eschew such games
altogether.146 Thus, in order to overcome opposition to state-sponsored
PLS initiatives, advocates need to mobilize substantial political
support.
Although governmental PLS programs have been successful in
other parts of the world, the political and legal environment in the
United States impedes their development. Of course, governmental
PLS programs, wherever they may arise, should be welcomed.
Nonetheless, prize-linked savings probably cannot achieve widespread
expansion without private vehicles.
B. Banks Face SubstantialLegal Barriers
Banks and credit unions are prominent among the potential
PLS vehicles discussed by advocates.147 Unlike politicians who are
accountable to disparate interests, financial institutions primarily
cater to consumers and are not limited by reelection concerns.
Financial institutions are free to launch programs to attract new
business, and they have a strong economic incentive to do So.148
If it were legally viable, banks would likely be effective vehicles
for launching PLS initiatives, as demonstrated by the success of Banco
Bilboa Vizcaya and other international commercial banks.1 49
Unfortunately, federal banking regulations virtually eliminate this
option in the United States. 50 Banks are some of the most highly
regulated institutions in the United States, and they are subject to the

144. See id. (showing all states except Alabama, Alaska, Hawaii, Mississippi, Nevada, Utah,
and Wyoming have a state lottery).
145. See, e.g., Dubner, supra note 138 (predicting lottery officials will not support PLS
contests); Who Could Say No to a "No-Lose Lottery"?, supra note 142 (podcast interviewing state
lottery directors Gordon Medenica of New York and Leo DiBenigno of Florida and highlighting
that neither embraces prize-linked savings).
146. For instance, Alabama voters rejected a 1999 lottery referendum by a 54% vote. See
Alabama Voters Reject Education Lottery, http://perma.cclUL4N-M9S5 (usatoday.com, archived
Feb. 16, 2014).
147. See Prize-Linked Savings, supra note 5, at 3 (evaluating various PLS vehicles).
148. See, e.g., Guillbn & Tschoegl, supra note 16, at 223 (analyzing the appeal of PLS
accounts from the perspective of financial institutions).
149. See supra Part I.B.
150. Prize-Linked Savings, supra note 5, at 4.
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fragmented and overlapping jurisdiction of multiple federal agencies,
including the Federal Reserve Board,15 the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency,152 and the FDIC.153 Federal statutes expressly
prohibit national- and state-chartered banks from operating a lottery,
and banks cannot even "announce, advertise, or publicize the
existence of any lottery."154 Banks cannot therefore sponsor PLS
programs without substantial changes in federal banking laws. Given
the trend toward increasing federal regulation of banks after the
recent financial crisis,155 this is unlikely.
Despite these substantial regulatory barriers, PLS advocates
are educating federal policymakers about the potential benefits of
prize-linked savings. In 2009, the FDIC's Advisory Committee on
Economic Inclusion announced its intention to study the potential
benefits of prize-linked savings for low-income individuals. 56
Nevertheless, though the Advisory Committee heard a report from
Peter Tufano (who chaired the Subcommittee on Prize-Linked
Savings), the FDIC took no action to facilitate PLS initiatives by
federally insured banks.15 7 More recently, in October of 2013, Senator
Jerry Moran of Kansas and Congressman Derek Kilmer of
Washington introduced "The American Savings Promotion Act," a bill
that would remove federal statutory barriers currently prohibiting
banks from offering PLS initiatives 58 Should this proposed legislation
151. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 248, 248-1 (2012) (enumerating the powers of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and authorizing the Board of Governors to promulgate
regulations).
152. See id. § 1 (establishing the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency as a bureau
within the Treasury Department charged "with assuring the safety and soundness of, and
compliance with laws and regulations" of financial institutions under its jurisdiction).
153. See id. §§ 1811(a), 1828 (establishing the agency authority of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation).
154. See id. § 25a (prohibiting national banks from participating in lottery related activity);
id. § 339 (prohibiting state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System from the
same); id. § 1829a (prohibiting state nonmember banks from the same).
155. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 5301 (2012) (instituting major reforms and introducing increased federal regulation of banks
and other financial institutions); see also Jan Bissett & Margi Heinen, Are You Occupied by
Dodd-Frank?,91 MICH. B.J. 50, 50 (2012) (discussing the "avalanche of regulation" for financial
institutions promulgated pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act in the wake of the recent recession).
156. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Advisory Committee to Explore PrizeLinked Savings, Outreach to Underserved and Low-Income Consumers (July 23, 2009), available
at http://perma.cc/8VZG-3MG2.

157. Id.; see also FDIC Advisory Committee on Economic Inclusion (ComE-IN) Meeting,
http://perma.cc/G8S2-7FZZ (fdic.gov, archived Feb. 16, 2014).
158. American Savings Promotion Act, S. 1597, 113th Cong. (2013) (as referred to S. Comm.
on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affiars, Oct. 29, 2013); American Savings Promotion Act, H.R. 3374,
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be successful, it would be a great victory for prize-linked savings. In
the meantime, however, banks cannot legally offer PLS contests.
C. Credit Unions Have the Most Promise
Although banks do not currently have the authority to launch
PLS programs, the legal restrictions on credit unions are more
flexible. As a preliminary matter, it is helpful to highlight some basic
differences in terminology used to describe credit unions versus
traditional banks. 159 Whereas bank customers are "account holders"
with "certificates of deposit" or "savings accounts," credit union
customers are "members" who hold a "share certificate" or "share
account."160 There are key structural differences as well: banks are forprofit institutions ultimately beholden to shareholder interests, but
credit unions are nonprofits that use their retained earnings to
provide favorable interest rates and other benefits for members.161
Because banks and credit unions receive different forms of federal
insurance, they exist within different regulatory spheres. 162
Credit unions are under the jurisdiction of the National Credit
Union Association ("NCUA").s 63 Unlike federal banking law, the
Federal Credit Union Act does not prohibit savings promotions or
lotteries. 164 Moreover, the NCUA has promulgated regulations that
enable credit unions to conduct raffles for marketing purposes. 65
Given this flexible regulatory scheme, credit unions could launch
113th Cong. (2013) (as referred to H.R. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec., and
Investigations, Jan. 9, 2014).
159. See Debbie Dragon, The Differences Between Credit Unions and Banks,
http://perma.cc/P223-TZPP (depositaccounts.com, archived Feb. 16, 2014).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. While the FDIC is an independent federal agency that insures the deposits made in
banks up to at least $250,000, the National Credit Union Administration is the independent
federal agency that insures the accounts of members in federal and (most) state-chartered credit
unions. See NCUA Share Insurance Fund Information, Reports, and Statements, supra note 9.
Compare Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1751 (2012) (establishing the NCUA), with
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1811(a) (establishing the FDIC).
163. Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1766 (authorizing the National Credit Union
Association Board to regulate federally chartered credit unions).
164. See id. §§ 1752-95k (containing no such prohibition); see also Save to Win: 2009 Final
Project Results, supra note 1, at 7 (noting the legal viability of PLS programs sponsored by credit
unions).
165. 12 C.F.R. § 721.3(i) (2014) (including "promotional activities such as raffles" within
marketing activities that are "preapproved as incidental powers" of credit unions); see also Save
to Win: 2009 Project Results, supra note 1, at 7 (recognizing that credit unions legally possess
this important capability).

928

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:3:907

initiatives like Michigan's Save to Win program without any lobbying
on the federal level.
In the realm of state law, however, gaming laws vary
significantly and pose legal problems for credit unions contemplating
prize-linked savings.166 Nevertheless, PLS advocates in a handful of
states have successfully lobbied for statutory amendments that enable
credit unions to conduct savings promotions. 167 Within the last three
years, state legislatures in Connecticut, Maine, North Carolina,
Washington, Nebraska, Rhode Island, and Maryland amended their
relevant laws to authorize PLS programs under the label "savings
promotion raffles."168 These legislative changes reflect the combined
efforts of Doorways to Dreams, state credit union leagues, and
antipoverty nonprofits. 169 Credit unions have responded quickly to
these amendments, and Save to Win programs are already underway
in Nebraska, North Carolina, and Washington. 170 Moreover, bills
recently introduced in Indiana and Oregon further demonstrate a
growing trend among states willing to authorize credit union PLS
programs.171

In sum, credit unions emerge as the best option among the
available PLS vehicles. No PLS program can succeed if it is illegal,
and credit unions have more legal flexibility than public institutions
and private banks. Credit unions have an additional advantage in that
they can learn from and build upon the MCUL's success with the Save
to Win program in Michigan.
Despite the emergence of credit union PLS programs in some
states, most jurisdictions retain significant legal roadblocks. Credit
unions in these jurisdictions are not powerless, however. Determined
166. Save to Win: 2009 ProjectResults, supra note 1, at 7; see also supra Part II.A (describing
the implications of state gaming laws that prohibit lottery activity).
167. Legislative Success, http://perma.cclY7GC-3FQA (d2dfund.org, archived Feb. 17, 2014).
168. CONN. GEN. STAT. P.A. 13-96 § 1; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 1831(5), (14-A); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 54-109.64; WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.0356; NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-701; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-529; MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 6-716.
169. See Legislative Success, supra note 167 (highlighting the roles of various credit union
leagues and nonprofit organizations).

170. See supra notes 86-89; Matt Halvorson, Two Washington Credit Unions Approve Prize
Linked Savings Programs,http://perma.cc/6GPS-U6MX (nwcua.org, archived Feb. 16, 2014).
171. Indiana House Bill 1235-to authorize credit unions to conduct savings promotion rafflespassed in both houses of the state legislature on March 12, 2014 and awaits the governor's
signature. See House Bill 1235, http://perma.cc/4C5K-6HES (iga.in.gov, archived Mar. 25, 2014).
In Oregon, a bill has been introduced that would require the Oregon State Lottery to establish a
work group to study the "feasibility of allowing financial institutions to offer prize-linked savings
accounts under [the] authority of [the] Oregon State Lottery." See HB 4079 A,
http://perma.cc/B9JR-LW2F (olis.leg.state.or.us, archived Mar. 25, 2014).
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IV. OBTAINING ENABLING LEGISLATION: PRACTICAL AND
LEGAL CONCERNS

Prize-linked savings is steadily gaining the attention of
financial innovators across the United States. The time is ripe for
credit unions-the most promising PLS vehicles-to further advance
this movement.173 Because PLS products will attract new savers,
legislative changes that facilitate this new opportunity are in credit
unions' collective best interest.174 Accordingly, credit unions must
become better organized and more proactive about obtaining
legislative reform. 75 Collaboration among credit unions will not only
generate more political attention, but it will also improve the
legislative process by incorporating the creative insights of many
different organizations.
Those that lobby for PLS-enabling legislation should anticipate
opposition. Furthermore, PLS advocates must carefully consider the
effectiveness of preexisting state legislation authorizing PLS contests.
Accordingly, Part IV.A first identifies the common arguments against
prize-linked savings. Next, Part lV.B compares the technical
provisions of the enabling legislation in the states that already allow
PLS programs. Finally, Part IV.C develops a framework that drafters
can build on in order to ensure the proper implementation of savings
promotions.
A. Anticipating and Responding to Opposition
Although prize-linked savings strongly appeals to consumers,
credit unions, and antipoverty advocates,176 efforts to achieve enabling
legislation will likely encounter opposition from groups invested in the
172. See Save to Win: 2009 Project Results, supra note 1, at 10 (suggesting pursuit of
enabling legislation as an alternative to structuring PLS programs as sweepstakes).
173. Jim Rubenstein, Savings Raffle Campaigns Show Progress Nationally,
http://perma.ccl6T3R-6ZA4 (cutimes.com, archived Feb. 16, 2014).
174. See supra Parts II.A & III.A.
175. See generally DAVID P. BARON, BUSINESS AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 2 (7th ed. 2013)
(emphasizing that business management teams must give due attention to the critically
important effects of the "non-market environment"--defined as "composed of the social, political,
and legal arrangements that structure interactions outside of, but in conjunction with, markets
and contracts").
176. See supraPart H.A.
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status quo. The precise political landscape differs from state to state,
but PLS advocates should expect resistance from powerful interest
groups. But rather than becoming discouraged, PLS advocates should
anticipate opposition and devise strategies to effectively respond. 177
Prize-linked savings programs will likely face resistance from
three major interest groups. First, some antigambling groups broadly
oppose all games of chance. These groups already accuse both staterun and private lotteries of causing various social problems. 178 They
contend that lotteries encourage "pathological gambling" and lead to
irresponsible spending habits and even bankruptcies. 1 79 These fears
are amplified when it comes to children, and critics complain that the
easy access and widespread advertising of lottery games glorifies
gambling as an alternative to hard work.180
Fierce lottery opponents could distort the public's perception
and undermine PLS initiatives that actually build positive saving
habits.181 Therefore, credit unions cannot passively assume that the
general public will recognize and appreciate the advantages of PLS
products. Instead, they should actively disseminate accurate
information about the promising features of PLS instruments to
consumers and state legislators alike.182 By carefully distinguishing
PLS programs from traditional lotteries, advocates will assuage
antigambling concerns and attract more support from state
lawmakers.
Second, existing state-sponsored lotteries are powerful
institutions that may resist PLS enabling legislation.183 As described
in Part III, most state-sponsored lotteries operate under narrow
177. See BARON, supranote 175, at 45 (suggesting that business management teams predict
the actions of the various interests that comprise the nonmarket environment as an important
stage in developing a nonmarket strategy).
178. See, e.g., Carlton, supra note 108, at 780 (highlighting the opinion of lottery opponents
that such games of chance have adverse social effects).
179. Id. at 780.
180. See, e.g., Rychlak, supra note 26, at 69-70. Such fears motivate laws in several states
that criminalize sale of lottery tickets to minors. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-51-122(5)(c)
(Tennessee law prohibiting the sale of state lottery tickets to individuals under the age of
eighteen); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-35-214 (Colorado law making it unlawful to sell a lottery ticket
to any person under eighteen).
181. See supra Part II.C.
182. See BARON, supra note 175, at 195-97 (arguing that lobbying governmental officials is
an important part of any business's strategy to effect political and legal change). Information
about the basic structure of PLS accounts would be designated as "technical information" within
Professor Baron's framework. Id at 197.
183. See, e.g., Dubner, supra note 138 (identifying state lottery officials as likely opponents
of private PLS initiatives).
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exceptions to lottery prohibitions.18 4 These statutory exceptions
effectively grant monopoly power to state-run lotteries, and lottery
officials are not likely to give that up without a fight.185 Credit unions
should expect resistance because PLS initiatives are "risk-free"
programs that may attract habitual lottery players. Moreover,
politicians often defend public lotteries as an important revenue
source and a necessary tool to stay economically competitive with
neighboring states. 8 6 Therefore, because PLS contests may pose
unwelcome competition for established lotteries,'87 proponents may
face an uphill battle in many state legislatures. In states with
powerful pro-lottery groups, PLS advocates should actively seek
compromise. Accordingly, if credit unions willingly embrace the kind
of limiting provisions discussed in Part IV.C below, prize-linked
savings will appear far less threatening to existing lotteries.
Finally, PLS advocates may also encounter push back from
consumer groups that are wary of fraudulent activity by financial
institutions. PLS products may seem too good to be true, and credit
unions will likely promote them to financially vulnerable consumers.
The enticement of grand prize drawings may induce deposits from
individuals who do not fully understand the mechanics of PLS
accounts. Specifically, consumers may not adequately appreciate that
they are sacrificing a portion of the interest that they could otherwise
earn from a traditional savings account. 88 Of course, PLS initiatives
do not discourage traditional certificates of deposit but instead are
designed to encourage saving behavior among nonsavers, who would
otherwise just resort to immediate consumption.189 Nonetheless,
consumer groups will likely demand that credit unions set minimum
interest rates and fully explain the mechanics of PLS accounts.
Consumer advocates may have additional concerns about the
fairness of PLS programs and the mechanisms for delivering prizes.
184. See Rychlak, supra note 26, at 42, 47 (evaluating the legal climate surrounding statesponsored lotteries).
185. See, e.g., Dubner, supra note 138 (interviewing a state official of Florida's statesponsored lottery).
186. See Rychlak, supra note 26, at 42, 47 (evaluating the legal climate surrounding statesponsored lotteries).
187. See, e.g., Dubner, supra note 138 (referring to PLS contests as a "natural rival" of state
run lotteries that bring in "an annual profit of $17.9 billion").
188. See supraPart II.A (describing the typical structure for PLS accounts).
189. See, e.g., Tufano et al., supra note 20, at 8 (highlighting the appeal of prize-linked
savings for nonsavers and unbanked Americans); see also Save to Win: 2009 Final Project
Results, supra note 1, at 15 (reporting that a majority of Save to Win participants had not been
regular savers before opening the PLS account).

932

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:3:907

Interest groups may insist on some guarantee that credit unions will
actually distribute the prizes promised in their marketing
materials.1 90 Similarly, policymakers may distrust PLS initiatives
unless there are rules preventing individuals from "gaming the
system" and receiving contest entries without saving any additional
money.191

These consumer-protection criticisms of PLS contests are
certainly valid. Credit unions can resolve these concerns and help
legitimize prize-linked savings by establishing clearly structured
program terms. Credit unions must make clarity the utmost priority
in their marketing materials. Credit unions should likewise develop
ethical standards, disclosure policies, and mission statements that
promise to use PLS programs to promote the best interests of their
members. Furthermore, credit unions can gain credibility by taking
the initiative and proposing statutory limitations and government
regulations of PLS initiatives.192
By anticipating pushback from antigambling interests, state
lottery officials, and consumer advocacy groups, PLS proponents can
develop legislative proposals that preempt many of the common
concerns with prize-linked savings. When credit unions and their
allies remain mindful of the opposition, they can make strategic
concessions that will facilitate ultimate political success. If credit
unions demonstrate their amenability to statutory restrictions and
government monitoring, PLS programs may not incite an aggressive
response from opposing groups. Part IV.C provides model provisions
that could be used to facilitate expansion of PLS programs while
addressing critics' concerns.
B. Examining Existing State Legislation
Campaigns to facilitate prize-linked savings will be most
successful when credit unions and their allies become directly involved
in the legislative process. By drafting and proposing their own
compromise bills, PLS advocates can avoid political backlash and
190. For an analogous example of sweepstakes fraud, see Press Release, Fed. Trade
Comm'n, FTC Sues to Stop Massive Sweepstakes Scam (Sept. 23, 2013), available at
http://perma.cc/DP3S-XJ4C.
191. PLS program terms that disqualify participants for withdrawing funds can eliminate
this concern. See, e.g., Save to Win: 2009 Final Project Results, supra note 1, at 9 (noting that
Michigan's Save to Win program allowed only one withdrawal per year).
192. Part V of this Note outlines model provisions to effectively accommodate consumer
protectionist concerns.
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more readily achieve their goals. In drafting new proposals, PLS
advocates should first examine the enabling amendments already
enacted in Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, North
Carolina, Rhode Island, and Washington.193 This Section compares
and contrasts the technical provisions adopted by these states. Part
IV.C then identifies the most effective provisions and suggests a form
of model legislation that would best placate opposition and facilitate
the development of prize-linked savings.
Currently, the authorizing legislation in most states refers to
PLS programs as "savings promotions raffles" and focuses on
adjustments in gaming and finance laws.194 While no two enabling
provisions are identical, there are common themes among all eight
states. The following discussion summarizes these major themes, and
the Appendix at the end of this Note includes a table of existing
legislation that highlights the key provisions of each state's statute.
Statutory authorization for PLS raffles may take various
forms. Both Maine and Nebraska enable credit unions to conduct
savings promotions by exempting them from state antigambling
laws.195 Maine explicitly excludes "savings promotions raffles" from
the definition of "games of chance," which are otherwise prohibited. 96
Similarly, Nebraska inserts "savings promotion raffles" into the
definition of "gift enterprise"-a term used to describe conduct that
does not fall under the prohibition on gambling.197 In contrast, six
states-Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, Rhode
Island, and Washington-directly authorize credit unions to conduct
savings promotion raffles.' 98 Ultimately, the manner in which prizelinked savings is authorized in each state necessarily depends upon
the existing statutory framework.
Once savings promotion raffles are directly authorized, states
generally impose certain requirements on their operation. The
enabling statutes all narrowly define the term "savings promotion
raffle" in a manner consistent with the following: a "contest conducted
193. CONN. GEN. STAT. P.A. 13-96 § 1; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17 § 1831(5), (14-A); MD. CODE
ANN., FIN. INST. § 6-716; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 490.411; NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-701; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 54-109.64; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-5-29; WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.0356.
194. Id.
195. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17 § 1831(5), (14-A); NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-701.
196. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17 § 1831(5), (14-A).
197. NEB. REV. STAT. §9-701.
198. CONN. GEN. STAT. P.A. 13-96 § 1; MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 6-716; MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 490.411; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54-109.64; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-5-29; WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.46,0356 (including credit unions in the statutory definition of "financial institutions").
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by a credit union ... in which a chance of winning a designated prize
is obtained by the deposit of a specified amount of money in a savings
account."199 In addition, each state specifies that either (1) minimum
deposits must be the "sole consideration" for contest entry200 or (2) no
additional fees may be charged for participation. 20 1 Moreover, five
states require PLS contests to give each entry an equal chance of
being drawn. 202
Beyond these basic provisions, some state legislatures have
imposed still more program requirements. For instance, Connecticut
requires consumers to be eighteen years old to participate in savings
promotion raffles, 203 and Maryland limits eligibility to "adult"
residents of the state. 204 Washington participants may only receive
prizes if they retain the minimum deposit amount in their PLS
account for "at least twelve months."205 Maine imposes several
detailed program requirements, specifying that PLS raffles may be
"offered no more than 2 times per year," the "total of the designated
prizes for each raffle [may] not exceed $1,000," and PLS savings
accounts must "provid[e] interest at a comparable rate to other
savings accounts" offered by the credit union. 206
Most states that currently allow PLS products also require
credit unions to satisfy record keeping standards and other duties. Six
of these states require credit unions to maintain books and records of
their activities in order to facilitate audits. 207 Five states protect
existing credit union members by establishing, with slight variations
in language, that PLS programs must not jeopardize the "safe and
sound" operation-or, in Rhode Island, "financial soundness"-of the

199. See, e.g. NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-701.
200. CONN. GEN. STAT. P.A. 13-96 § 1; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17 § 1831(5), (14-A); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 490.411; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54-109.64; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-5-29.
201. MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 6-716; NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-701; WASH. REV. CODE

§ 9.46.0356.
202. CONN. GEN. STAT. P.A. 13-96 § 1; MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 6-716; MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §490.411; NEB. REV. STAT. §9-701; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-5-29.
203. CONN. GEN. STAT. P.A. 13-96 § 1.
204. MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 6-716.
205. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.0356.
206. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17 § 1831(5), (14-A).
207. CONN. GEN. STAT. P.A. 13-96 § 1; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 490.411; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 54-109.64; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-5-29; WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.0356. Maryland requires
maintenance of books and records but does not contain language referencing an audit. MD. CODE
ANN., FIN. INST. § 6-716. Maine and Nebraska do not contain books and records requirements.
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17 § 1831(5), (14-A); NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-701.
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credit union. 208 Only Nebraska goes so far as to impose a duty upon
credit unions to pay out all of the prizes that they offer during a PLS
program. 209
Furthermore, PLS states each require some element of
program transparency. The statutes vary significantly, however, in
the extent to which express disclosure is required (if at all). Michigan
and Rhode Island merely require that permissible savings promotion
raffles do not "mislead credit union members." 210 Notably, these
provisions do not require active disclosure, and they fail to indicate
whether protection extends to prospective customers who may be
attracted by PLS products but are not yet members of the credit
union. In contrast, Nebraska establishes that credit union members
may not "print, publish, or circulate literature or advertising
material . . . which is false, deceptive, or misleading." 2 11 Nebraska's
statute does not address current credit union members, who still have
a financial interest in the actions of their credit union even if they do
not personally enter the PLS raffle. 212
The remaining five states mandate varying degrees of direct
disclosure by credit unions. Maine requires disclosure of the "terms
and conditions of the promotion," 213 Connecticut adds that such
disclosure must be provided to "each of its share account holders," 214
and North Carolina further mandates full disclosure to "account
holders and prospective account holders."215 Maryland requires credit
unions to publicly post and disclose in any promotional materials the
following information: the terms and conditions of the contest, a
208. See MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 6-716 (requiring that raffles must not harm Maryland
"credit union[s]' ability to operate in a safe and sound manner"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 490.411 (establishing that Michigan credit unions must not conduct raffle in a manner that
"jeopardizes the [credit unions] safety and soundness"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54-109.64
(establishing that North Carolina credit unions must conduct savings promotion raffles in a "safe
and sound manner"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-5-29 (establishing that savings promotion raffles in
Rhode Island must not "jeopardize" a credit union's "safety and financial soundness"); WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.46.0356 (establishing that Washington credit unions must not conduct savings
promotion raffles in an "unsafe and unsound or imprudent manner").
209. NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-701(3)(c) ("An operator shall not ... [flail to award prizes offered.").
210. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 490.411; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-5-29. Maryland law also
establishes that the PLS contest must not "mislead credit union members," but this is amplified
by additional disclosure requirements. MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 6-716.
211. NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-701(3)(b).
212. See, e.g., Dragon, supra note 159 (explaining that credit unions return all earnings to
their members in the form of higher interest rates or possibly dividends).
213. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17 § 1831(5), (14-A).
214. CONN. GEN. STAT. P.A. 13-96 § 1(b).
215. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54-109.64.
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disclaimer that no purchase is necessary, and a notice that the
number of entries determines the odds of winning.216 Washington also
specifies exactly what must be disclosed and requires that the odds be
disclosed "in ratio form, based on the total number of prizes to be
awarded and the total number of offers distributed." 217
Finally, certain states have adopted mechanisms for
governmental oversight of PLS programs. Neither Maine nor North
Carolina specifically monitor savings promotion raffles, though credit
unions in both states are subject to occasional review by
administrative bodies. 218 Maryland makes savings promotion raffles
subject to the approval of the Commissioner of Financial
Regulation, 219 and Connecticut requires that the Banking
Commissioner first determine the "secure financial integrity" of each
credit union seeking to conduct a PLS contest. 220 Maryland, Michigan,
Nebraska, Rhode Island, and Washington authorize particular
governmental agencies to investigate savings promotion raffles, and
the agency can then bring an enforcement action against programs
that violate the statutory requirements. 221
Of all the states with PLS enabling legislation, Rhode Island
requires the most direct governmental oversight. A credit union
seeking to conduct PLS raffles in Rhode Island must first provide the
Department of Business Regulation with "written notice of its intent"
to do so. 222 The notice must include an attestation that the contest
complies with all state, federal, and NCUA laws and regulations; that
the raffle will be conducted "in a manner that is fair and nondiscriminatory to all credit union members"; and that no "adverse

216. MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 6-716(c).
217. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.170.030.
218. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 9-B § 221 (The Superintendant of Financial Institutions
"shall examine each financial institution" organized under Maine law "at least once every 36
months or more frequently as the superintendent determines"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54-109.10-11
(the Administrator of the Credit Union Division of the North Carolina Department of Commerce
authorized "to examine at least once a year and oftener if ... deemed necessary, all credit
unions").
219. MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 6-716(b).
220. CONN. GEN. STAT. P.A. 13-96 § 1(b).
221. MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 6-716(b) (Commissioner of Financial Regulation); MICH.
CoMP. LAws ANN. § 490.411 (Commissioner of the Office of Financial Insurance Services); NEB.
REV. STAT. §9-701 (Nebraska Department of Revenue); R.I. GEN. LAws § 19-5-29 (Director of the
Department of Business Regulation); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.0356 (Director of Financial
Institutions).
222. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-5-29(a).
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impact on the financial condition of the credit union" will result from
the contest. 223
C. DraftingNew EnablingLegislation
As PLS advocates draft proposals in the remaining forty-two
states, they should draw on the limiting and monitoring provisions of
existing legislation. State legislatures must incorporate certain
features to ensure proper implementation of prize-linked savings.
Accordingly, this Section analyzes the desirability of required program
terms, additional contest limitations, recordkeeping duties, required
disclosures, and governmental oversight of PLS programs.
1. Authorization and Required Program Terms
As a preliminary matter, state legislators can most effectively
regulate PLS initiatives with statutes that explicitly permit credit
unions to offer savings promotion raffles. As described in Part IV.B,
eight states have accomplished this in one of two ways: specifically
exempting PLS contests from prohibitions on gambling or directly
authorizing certain financial institutions to run PLS contests. 224
Admittedly, some other jurisdictions have gaming and banking laws
that may already permit PLS initiatives. For instance, laws in Arizona
and Georgia arguably do not forbid PLS activity, though the credit
unions in those states have not yet tested this possibility. 225
Nonetheless, even where legislative change is not necessary, an
explicit authorization of PLS programs is still prudent. Statutory
amendments signify the legislature's intent to allow PLS initiatives,
and explicit permission will remove the legal uncertainty that
currently deters credit unions from hosting these programs. Moreover,
223. Id.
224. See supra Part IV.B (highlighting that Maine and Nebraska exclude PLS programs
from prohibitions on gambling, and that Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina,
Rhode Island and Washington have enacted statutes that directly authorize savings promotion
raffles).
225. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3302 (excluding from antigambling laws raffles operated by
qualified nonprofits, which may include credit unions, subject to restrictions); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-12-22.1 (authorizing nonprofits qualified under 501(c) of the IRC (credit unions qualify
under 501(c)(14)(A) to obtain a license to operate raffles); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-650(6) (allowing
Georgia credit unions to undergo activities not otherwise prohibited by state law with
governmental approval). Close interpretation of statutory provisions regarding lotteries and
credit unions in other states may reveal that additional jurisdictions would not need legislative
change to enable credit union PLS promotions.
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express enabling legislation provides an efficient avenue for states to
simultaneously introduce regulations and program limitations that
will prevent potential abuses of prize-linked savings.
If states do decide to enact PLS-enabling legislation, statutes
must be drafted according to each state's particular gaming and
banking laws. In other words, some statutes will be drafted as an
exemption from the gaming laws, while others will directly grant
credit unions the authority to operate PLS programs.
More importantly, states must carefully choose which program
requirements and limitations to incorporate into the authorizing
legislation. For instance, state legislatures should clearly articulate
the basic structure of PLS programs and choose deposits as the sole
criterion for prize eligibility. Any one of the existing state statutes
described in Part IV.B and outlined in the Appendix would be an
adequate model. In addition, states should clarify that all program
entries have an equal chance of winning prizes, just like five states
currently require. 226 This provision is particularly important to
ensuring the fairness of PLS programs.
Similarly, drafters can use the definition section to limit the
class of consumers eligible to participate in PLS drawings. Some
states may want to prevent minors from participating in PLS
contests-perhaps out of a paternalistic concern that younger
individuals cannot understand the programs or a fear that savings
lotteries glorify gambling. 227 Connecticut and Maryland, for example,
define program participants as "eligible credit union members" who
have reached a particular age. 228 States should not, however, establish
an age limit for PLS programs that exceeds the age limit for
traditional state lottery games. 229 Because saving money with a PLS
initiative is a responsible alternative to consuming lottery tickets,
states should at least equalize the availability of the two options.

226. CONN. GEN. STAT. P.A. 13-96 § 1; MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 6-716; MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 490.411; NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-701; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-5-29.
227. See supra Part IV.B (identifying the concerns of interest groups who may oppose PLS
initiatives out of general distaste for behavior that resembles gambling).
228. CONN. GEN. STAT. P.A. 13-96 § 1; MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 6-716.
229. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-51-122(5)(c) (prohibiting the sale of state lottery tickets
to individuals under the age of eighteen); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-35-214 (making it unlawful to
sell a lottery ticket to any person under eighteen).

2014]

SAVE NOW, WIN LATER

939

2. Further Contest Limitations
After defining the basic mandatory terms, states have an
opportunity to further control the development of PLS contests by
requiring that credit unions adopt additional program terms. For
instance, state policymakers may prefer to limit the number of annual
drawings, cap the value of grand-prize offerings, or prohibit
withdrawal of deposits. States may directly incorporate such program
restrictions into the enabling legislation 230 or delegate promulgation of
the precise rules to an agency. 231
Admittedly, state-imposed restrictions may frustrate efforts to
maximize the potential benefits of prize-linked savings. As mentioned
in Part II, PLS initiatives have proven most successful when credit
unions maintain the flexibility to adjust the frequency and value of
prizes in response to consumer preferences. 232 Accordingly, some
states may prefer a minimalist approach to regulation, leaving the
PLS vehicles with a greater degree of flexibility and creativity. 233 In
states that choose to regulate with a heavy hand, however, credit
unions should embrace program restrictions that assuage the concerns
of PLS opponents because compromise ultimately improves the
likelihood that PLS-enabling legislation will be enacted. The following
Subsections evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of imposing certain
restrictions on PLS programs.
i. Limited Number of PermissibleDrawings
Some states may elect to follow Maine in allowing only a
limited number of savings promotion raffles by a single credit union in
a given year. 234 Such restrictions are not unprecedented; several states
230. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17 § 1831(5), (14-A) (limiting frequency and amount of
prizes and requiring that interest on PLS accounts be "comparable" to other accounts); WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 9.46.0356, 19.170.030 (requiring that eligible participants maintain deposit for "at
least twelve months").
231. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. P.A. 13-96 § 1 (authorizing the Banking Commissioner to
regulate savings promotion raffles); NEB. REV. STAT. §9-701(5)(a) (authorizing the Department of
Revenue to regulate savings promotion raffles).
232. See, e.g., Smith-Ramani et al., supra note 14, at 11 (reporting that the 2012 Save to Win
program in Michigan changed its prize structure to offer more frequent prizes of smaller value in
response to findings from previous years and data about consumer preferences).
233. See Part VI: Appendix (Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, and Rhode Island impose
none of the restrictions discussed in this section, nor do they authorize regulators to impose
further program limitations).
234. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17 § 1831(5), (14-A) (establishing that permissible PLS contests
may be offered no more than twice per year).
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control the frequency of charitable raffles in a similar manner. 235
Allowing PLS contests only twice a year, for example, might make
such initiatives less threatening to state lotteries, which often offer
daily drawings and instant games. 236
On the other hand, narrow authorizations significantly limit
the ability of PLS vehicles to structure contests in ways that respond
to consumer preferences. For instance, the existing Save to Win
programS 237 offer both annual and monthly prizes in order to
continually engage savers and to compensate for the low odds of
winning. 238 In fact, over the course of five years, credit unions in
Michigan have repeatedly adjusted the prize structure of Save to Win
to accommodate program expansion. 239 States that value this kind of
flexibility may want to follow Washington's lead and explicitly
authorize both annual and monthly prizes. 240
ii. Caps on Prize Values
States must similarly decide whether or not to establish the
maximum dollar amount that a credit union may offer in prizeseither in a single drawing or in the aggregate throughout the year. 241
Value caps can minimize competition with state lotteries and prevent
overexcitement among consumers who may misunderstand program
trade-offs. 242 Caps on prize amounts may also maximize the portion of
interest that inures to consumers rather than the jackpot pool. 2 43
235. See, e.g., TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 2002.052 (establishing a limit of two raffles per year
by charities).
236. See, e.g., How to Play, http://perma.cclVL3Z-3UFX (tnlottery.com, archived Feb. 16,
2014) (providing the frequent schedule for drawing-style games, instant games and scratch-off
games for the Tennessee Lottery); Games, http://perma.ccN3RL-RSGX (galottery.com, Feb. 16,
2014) (similarly listing omnipresent lottery options, including daily contest drawings).
237. In partnership with Doorways to Dreams, Save to Win programs have launched in
Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina and Washington. See supra notes 86-89 (providing program
details for each state).
238. See, e.g., Building Financial Security Through Fun: Findings from Save to Win
Expansion, http://perma.cclV9AD-82CY (d2dfund.org, archived Feb. 16, 2014) (noting the
diversity of prize designs for Save to Win programs and highlighting Michigan and Nebraska);
see also Guill6n & Tschoegl, supra note 16, at 223 (suggesting that frequent prize offerings
prevent consumer disinterest caused by low odds of winning).
239. Building FinancialSecurity Through Fun, supranote 238, at 6.
240. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.0356(1)(b) (authorizing annual and monthly drawings).
241. Maine alone has included a statutory prize maximum, indicating that the total of prizes
per permissible PLS raffle cannot exceed $1,000. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17 § 1831(5), (14-A).
242. See supraPart IV.A (noting that PLS contests may threaten existing state lotteries and
highlighting consumer protectionist concerns).
243. See supra Part II.A (describing mechanics of PLS programs).
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Moreover, prize caps may protect the stability of credit unions by
preventing them from overpledging prize money and potentially
harming existing members.24 4 Instead of flat caps on PLS prize
amounts, states could impose heightened requirements when prizes
exceed a certain value. For instance, the vetoed PLS-enabling bill in
New York would have established more stringent filing and reporting
requirements on credit unions that offered prizes in excess of
$5,000.245 Such a policy would indirectly limit jackpot amounts:
because greater prize values trigger additional regulatory costs, credit
unions have a monetary incentive to offer reduced amounts.
Maximum prize amounts nevertheless curb the flexibility of
PLS vehicles to respond to market preferences. Limits on the value of
grand prizes may also make savings raffles less attractive to
consumers and thereby undermine the purpose of authorizing prizelinked savings in the first place. Accordingly, some states may simply
trust the private sector and allow credit unions to set their own
amounts. 246
iii. Prohibitionson Withdrawal
Because prize-linked savings purports to encourage lasting
financial habits, the most effective programs will discourage
participants from immediately withdrawing their savings. At the
same time, PLS programs mostly appeal to low-income populations,
who are particularly vulnerable to financial crises and may need
access to their invested funds. 247 Thus, programs must strive to strike
a balance between these competing concerns. The Washington
legislature decided to disqualify any participants who withdraw their
base deposit within twelve months of entering the contest. 24 8 Other

244. Governments have long had an interest in preventing bank and credit union failure, as
indicated by the existence of federal deposit insurance. A state imposed prize cap would
supplement the federal NCUA regulations. See NCUA Share Insurance Fund Information,
Reports, and Statements, supra note 9 (highlighting NCUA's regulatory role).
245. S. 5145, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013) (vetoed by Veto Memo 229 on Sept. 27, 2013); see also
N.Y. GEN. BUS. § 369-e(4) (referenced in S. 5145 and requiring heightened requirements where
prizes exceed $5,000).
246. This more relaxed approach has been taken by Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan,
Nebraska, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Washington. See Part VI Appendix: Existing State
Legislation on Prize-Linked Savings.
247. See supra Part III.C (describing the potential for PLS initiatives to improve savings
habits among the financially vulnerable).
248. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.46.0356, 19.170.030.
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states have no such restrictions and thereby allow the directors of PLS
initiatives to set their own withdrawal policies. 249
This Note recommends that state legislatures refrain from
statutory prohibitions on withdrawal of PLS deposits. Credit unions
will likely develop withdrawal penalties on their own, as they, like
most financial institutions, have an economic incentive to maintain
the consistency of their accounts. 250 For instance, the Nebraska Save
to Win program established a disqualifying withdrawal penalty,
though it was less restrictive than Washington's outright prohibition,
and fewer than 1% of Nebraskan contest participants withdrew their
deposits each month. 251 Moreover, because private institutions have
access to consumer data, they are better equipped than state
legislatures to experiment with penalty structures to keep
accountholders engaged in long-term saving. 252 In the event that state
policymakers insist upon defining the withdrawal penalties, however,
this Note urges against Washington's blanket restriction. Instead,
states would be better off allowing at least one withdrawal before a
participant loses eligibility, as this model has proven successful in
Michigan. 253
3. Recordkeeping Standards and Other Duties
After defining the program terms, state policymakers should
also establish recordkeeping standards for PLS vehicles to follow.
States should follow the majority of jurisdictions that require credit
unions to maintain records that are "sufficient to facilitate an

249. No withdrawal terms have been statutorily prescribed by Connecticut, Maryland,
Maine, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, or Rhode Island. See Part VI Appendix: Existing
State Legislation on Prize-Linked Savings.
250. Withdrawal penalties serve as disincentive for the phenomenon known as a "bank run,"
which is equally applicable in the context of a credit union. For an explanation of bank runs, see
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures,Risk Monitoring, and the Market for
Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1156 (1988) (explaining that depository institutions are
often highly leveraged with a higher portion of liabilities in deposits that are available upon
demand while assets are "relatively illiquid" such that the institution is not "able to pay off all
depositors instantaneously).

251. BuildingFinancialSecurity Through Fun, supra note 238, at 3.
252. See, e.g., id. at 7 (expressing the intention of PLS advocates to continually experiment
with best practices in program design in order to best facilitate savings behavior).
253. See Save to Win: 2009 FinalProject Results, supra note 1, at 9 (describing the success of
Michigan's inaugural Save to Win program, which disqualified participants with more than one
withdrawal from the twelve month share certificate).
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audit." 254 This standard ensures that any agencies that oversee PLS
programs can adequately detect and punish fraudulent activity. An
overly specific records requirement may unduly burden credit unions,
but credit unions should be required to maintain records for PLS
programs that are at least comparable to their other accounts. In
addition, states should explicitly require credit unions to keep
identifying information about prizewinners for income tax purposes. 255
As explained in Part IV.A, consumer protection groups may
worry that credit unions might not ever actually distribute prize
money. 256 Thus, state policymakers should consider imposing further
accounting duties. For example, states could replicate Nebraska and
statutorily require credit unions to "not fail to award prizes offered." 257
Although this duty may seem to serve consumers' best interests, such
a provision may also have the unintended effect of binding credit
unions to pay out prizes that could drain their resources and endanger
the assets of other members. Imagine, for instance, that a PLS
program advertises a prize of $1,000 but overestimated the number of
participants willing to play. Should an insufficient number of
consumers invest in share certificates, the aggregate interest
accumulated may fail to fund the promised reward. In this scenario, a
statutory duty to pay the offered prizes would force the credit union to
allocate funds from other sources to the detriment of the institution's
overall stability.
Because an outright duty to pay offered prizes may have these
unintended consequences, states should consider an alternative
solution to protect consumers. Instead, states could require credit
unions to maintain a separate account for the pooled interest on PLS
accounts that funds program prizes. 25 8 Any duty to pay out prizes
could then attach to that separate account; credit unions would be
required to annually distribute all of the earmarked funds as prizes to
254. CONN. GEN. STAT. P.A. 13-96 § 1; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 490.411; N.C. GEN. STAT.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-5-29; WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.0356. Maryland requires
maintenance of books and records but does not reference an audit. MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST.
§ 6-716.
255. See Treas. Reg. § 1.74-1 (1960) (indicating that any amount received as a prize or
award is included in gross income for federal income tax purposes).
256. See supra Part IV.A (identifying predictable reactions to prize-linked savings from
consumer advocates).
257. NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-701.
258. For instance, the vetoed New York legislation would have required maintenance of a
separate trust account wherever the PLS prize exceeded $5,000. See S. 5145, Reg. Sess. (NY
2013) (vetoed by Veto Memo 229 on Sept. 27, 2013); see also N.Y. GEN. BUS. § 369-e(4)
(referenced in S. 5145 and requiring a special trust account for prizes exceeding $5,000).

§ 54-109.64;
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contest participants (but not funds from other sources). This slight
variation on the duty found in Nebraska's law serves the twin goals of
ensuring prize distributions to PLS customers and safeguarding other
credit union members.
4. Required Disclosures
As analyzed in Part IV.B, the eight states with PLS-enabling
statutes require disclosure of contest terms with varying degrees of
specificity. Although overly detailed disclosure requirements may
become unduly burdensome, a high degree of transparency is
warranted when PLS products are introduced for the first time.
Therefore it is critical for policymakers to carefully address both the
substance and the audience of disclosures.
Mandatory public disclosures not only deter credit unions from
committing fraud but also facilitate public awareness of the relatively
new and unknown phenomenon of prize-linked savings. States should
therefore require PLS vehicles to disclose key program information,
including the number of participating consumers, the likelihood of
winning, the formulas used to determine prize amounts, and the
documentation proving the prize money was delivered. Washington's
PLS laws provide a useful example for policymakers looking to draft
substantive disclosure requirements. 259 In addition, consumer
protection would be better served if state laws also required disclosure
of the precise portion of interest payments that are diverted to jackpot
pools, the existence of any withdrawal penalties, and the tax
consequences of receiving prize awards.
Beyond the substantive requirements, state policymakers
should also clarify to whom these disclosure duties are owed. As
highlighted in Part IV.B, existing state statutes do not consistently
reference both prospective and current credit union members in their
disclosure provisions. 260 Moreover, prohibitions against misleading
and false advertising require disclosure only indirectly; such simple
provisions do not oblige PLS vehicles to actively reveal particular
program mechanics. 261 Because PLS products are nontraditional
259. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.170.030.
260. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 490.411 (reference to credit union members does
not require disclosure to prospective PLS customers), and R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-5-29 (same), with
NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-701 (prohibition against false and misleading advertising fails to require any
disclosure to existing credit union members).
261. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 490.411; NEB. REV. STAT, § 9-701; R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 19-5-29.
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financial instruments, this Note advises that statutes explicitly
require direct disclosure. Specifically, this Note argues that
substantive information be provided not only to potential PLS
customers but also to nonparticipating credit union members who
have a legitimate financial interest in credit union affairs. 262 The
precise manner of disclosure-whether displayed at the credit unions,
distributed to customers when they open share certificates, or
included in credit union annual reports-is perhaps best determined
by regulators who are more familiar with the practices of financial
institutions in their state.
5. Governmental Oversight and Enforcement
Finally, PLS-enabling legislation should incorporate an
enforcement mechanism to ensure that credit unions comply with the
appropriate requirements and regulations. In pursuit of the most
effective enforcement strategy, policymakers should empower a
designated executive agency to monitor savings promotions and to
issue cease and desist orders for violations of statutory
requirements. 263 In the absence of explicit oversight provisions, all of
the aforementioned requirements would lack actual force. Especially
in states where opposition to PLS programs is significant,
policymakers may prefer to enact stronger enforcement mechanisms.
For example, states particularly concerned about the possibility of
fraudulent activity by credit unions should follow Nebraska and make
violations of the enabling statute punishable with fines. 2 64
As noted in Part IV.B, credit unions in Rhode Island must file a
notice of intent and an attestation of legal compliance with the
relevant regulations before they can launch a savings promotion
raffle. 265 This is an ideal model for states that want to closely guide
the development of prize-linked savings. But even states that prefer
less stringent regulation of PLS initiatives should consider the Rhode
Island method. States could also require credit unions to pay fees with

262. See, e.g., Dragon, supra note 159 (describing the common ownership structure of
nonprofit credit unions and the financial interests of credit union members).
263. CONN. GEN. STAT. P.A. 13-96 § 1 (Banking Commissioner); MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST.
§ 6-716 (Commissioner of Financial Regulation); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 490.411
(Commissioner of Office of Financial Insurance Services); NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-701 (Department
of Revenue); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-5-29 (Department of Business Regulation); WASH. REV. CODE
§9.46.0356 (Director of Financial Institutions).
264. NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-701.
265. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-5-29(a).
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each of these filings. The money collected from such fees could fund
the oversight and enforcement measures taken by the state agency
with jurisdiction over PLS contests.
Overall, state policymakers must adjust to their unique
political landscapes when drafting PLS-enabling legislation. This Part
has outlined a general framework to guide future legislation, and the
model provisions are designed to placate opposition, assuage
legitimate concerns, and enable states to effectively regulate PLS
programs. Of course, the precise format and terms of enabling
legislation will vary from state to state. For instance, some
legislatures will enact very detailed statutory requirements while
others may authorize an administrative agency to promulgate
regulations addressing specific program details. Regardless of the
ultimate regulatory form, state policymakers should remain
thoughtful about the consequences that each provision will have on
the future development of prize-linked savings.
V. CONCLUSION

Prize-linked savings capitalizes upon the rare alignment of
prudent financial behavior and an exciting game of chance.
Championed by antipoverty advocates such as Peter Tufano and
Doorways to Dreams, this innovative concept is a creative response to
the needs of financially vulnerable Americans who all too often lack
the savings they need to protect themselves against unpredictable
emergencies. The most basic PLS structure gives consumers a win-win
chance to receive monetary prizes, where the only cost of entering the
contest is the deposit of a minimum amount with a guaranteed return
of the principal plus interest.
Though PLS programs have a deep international history, they
have only recently gained traction in the United States. Federal and
state gaming prohibitions are partially to blame for the slow
development of domestic PLS contests, as savings raffles fall squarely
within longstanding bans on lottery activity. There are many potential
PLS vehicles, from governmental entities to private financial
institutions such as banks and credit unions. In the current regulatory
climate, credit unions have the most flexibility to launch PLS
programs, though state gaming laws remain a frustrating roadblock.
Nonetheless, often in partnership with Doorways to Dreams, PLS
advocates in some states have successfully lobbied for PLS-enabling
legislation. Credit unions in the remaining states must actively
develop a strategy to encourage their legislatures to follow suit.

2014]

SAVE NOW, WIN LATER

947

By anticipating the groups who will likely oppose prize-linked
savings (such as antigambling interests, existing state lotteries, and
consumer advocacy groups), PLS advocates can preempt their
criticisms by offering proposals that adequately address their
concerns. Drawing on existing PLS statutes, other states can borrow
certain provisions while adjusting or discarding others to best suit
their needs. This Note has suggested a framework that policymakers
can use to draft the ideal legislation.
The precise language enacted in future PLS-enabling
legislation should reflect the policy choices of a given jurisdiction.
State lawmakers should prescribe the level of government regulation
that appropriately responds to the political demands of their
constituents. Where, for instance, state lotteries or consumer advocacy
groups have a significant voice, state legislators should narrowly
authorize PLS programs and incorporate substantive limitations.
Where such critics are less prominent, however, state lawmakers
should leave ample room for PLS vehicles to innovate and experiment
with the contest terms. No matter what regulatory approach is taken,
credit unions and other PLS advocates should willingly embrace
regulatory provisions that make enabling legislation more politically
attainable. As prize-linked savings gains momentum in the United
States, properly drafted state laws will ensure the careful and
controlled development of this promising economic phenomenon.
Ann E. Watford*

* Doctor of Jurisprudence, Vanderbilt Law School, Class of 2014. I am deeply thankful for
the hard work and thoughtful contribution of the members of the Vanderbilt Law Review. I am
greatly indebted to my friends and coworkers at Impact Alabama, where I first witnessed the
benefits of prize-linked savings. Most of all, I am grateful for the love and support of my family.
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VI. APPENDIX: EXISTING STATE LEGISLATION ON
PRIZE-LINKED SAVINGS
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